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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOHN MICHAEL SHANE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-YS-

.JOHN ,V. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

No.

Case
12905

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, John Michael Shane, appeals from
a decision of the Third Judicial District Court, denying his release from the Utah State Prison upon a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On April 3, 1972, J-ohn Michael Shane filed a
petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging
that his commitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The matter came on for hearing on April 18,
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1972, be:ore the
.Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge,
who demed the pehtwn on April 25, 1972.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant. John l\Iichael Shane, seeks a revers·
al of the judgment of the court below with the direct·
ion that he he released from the custody of the respond·
ent upon a writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
J o]m .l\Iichael Shane entered a plea of guilty on
December 6, 1971, to the crime of I•,radulent Use of a ,
Creel it Card before the Honorable John F. 'Vahlquist
of the Second Judicial Court. (R. 29, Exhibit l·D,
p. 8). He was sentenced on December 22, 1971 to be
committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterm·
ina te term of not more than five years as provided by
law (R. 29).
The record of the Ogclen City Court indicates that
upon being informed by the Court of his right to the
aicl of counsel at every stage of the proceedings against
him, the appellant requested "to go as 'pro-per status.'"
( R.22). On December 1, 1971, the appellant requested
that counsel be appointed by the court; said request wai
granted and Richard W. llrahn was appointed (R. 23).
On December 2, 1971, the appellant appeared in court
with Mr. Braim and the financial statement of appellant
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[apparently sheet 3 of the affidavit is missing] ( R. 27,
28) was submitted to the Court and the court found that
the appellant was not impecunious. Thereupon the
Comt dismissed Mr. Braim as appellant's counsel. (R.
23). After
Ilrahn was <lissmissed, and without having d:scussed the matter with counsel, appellant waived
his preliminary hearing on the charge. (R. 24).
'Vithout knowing the purpose of the financial
statement (ll. 35) and apparently thinking that it related to either bail or sentence ( R. 36) , the appellant
listed assets in the affidavit which he in reality did not
own or have under his control. (R. 36)
The transcript of the entry of the plea of guilty
(Exhibit 1-D) indicates that the Court informed the
appellant of the following:
Right to counsel and right to have counsel
appo;nte<l free of charge (p. 2); Right to have
time to decide what plea to enter ( p. 2) ; Right
to trial by jury and right to subpeona witnesses and the right to cross-examine witnesses
against him ( p. 2) ; That a plea of guilty is
a judicial confession and no further proof of
guilt is required (p. 4); That appellant would
be "vulnerable to the sentence provided by law
for the charge." (p. 4)
The transcript of the entry of the plea also reflects
a dialogue between appellant and the court concerning
the appellant's right to counsel in which the appellant
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indicated that he would handle his own case and that he
had "three and one half years of law school at UCLA"
and that he had represented himself before. (Exhibit
1-D, p. a). At the habeas corpus hearing the appellant
indicated that he had not been in law school at UCLA
and that illstead the appellant had been monitoring
classes with a friend. ( R. 40)
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT IlEL<nv ERRED IN DENYING

APP:ELLAXT'S PETITION FOR \VRIT OF
HABEAS COHPUS BECAUSE THE APPEL·
LAXT \VAS EFFEC'l'IYELY DENIED HIS
lUGII'f TO APPOINTED COUNSEL.
It is well settled that an indigent must be provided
counsel in felony cases, Gideon v. TJT ainwright, 372
U.S. 33;3, 9 L.ed 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, 93 ALR 2d 733
( 19():3), and recently the U.S. Supreme Court extended
that right to any accused who may be deprived of his
liberty whether he be charged with a felony or misde·
meanor, A
v. II m11li11, ____ U.S. ________ , 32 L.Ed.
2d ;mo, 11 Criminal Law Reporter 3089(.June12, 1972.)
It is suhmitted that in the case at bar the ap·
pellant was effectively 1lenied his right to counsel, a.nd
that appellant did not knowingly and intelligently waive
his right to counsel. Although it appears on the record
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that appellant initia11y wanted to proceed without
counsel, it also appears that appellant requested appointed counsel before the preliminary hearing. Counsel was
appointed, appellant filled out the affidavit of financial status and counsel was taken away. (R. 23) At the
time that appellant changed his plea the court said, "If
you are unable to employ an attorney on your own, the
court will help you to see that you have one." (Exhibit
1-D, p. 2) \Vhile this information might be sufficient
in many circumstances, it is submitted that at least in
this particular situation such a warning was sufficient
to apprise appellant of his right to appointed counsel
because appellant's experience with the court was that
he could ask for an attorney but that attorney would be
taken away.
Further, it is submitted that it is clear that from
the record that appellant did not validly waive his right
to counsel. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege which
must he made by a defendant who has been apprised of
his rights and who has an intelligent conception of the
consequences of his act. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 83 L.Ed 1461 (1937); Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70
(1962).

It is submitted that appellant clearly did not have
an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act.
Appellant testified at the habeas corpus hearing that he
pleaded guilty because he was advised by a police officer
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that if he pleaded guilty, he would get probation. The
court fa;led to apprise appellant of the consequences of
his waiver of counsel and only said that a person who
represents himself has problems in addition to those
which an attorney would have in representing another
person. (Exhibit 1-D, p. 3). It is submitted that such
a warning did not sufficiently apprise appellant of the
consequences of his waiver of counsel and thusly that
appe1lant's waiver was invalid. It is further submitten I
that because appellant's ,.,·aiver of counsel was invalid,
appellant's right to counsel was effectively denied him. '
Because of that denial, appellant's guilty plea was
clearly unlawful and unconstitutional as a denial of due
process.

I'OINT II
THE COURT BELCHV ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLAXT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT O}'
HABEAS COUPUS RE.CAUSE THE RECORD
DOES :NOT SHO'V THAT APPELLANT'S
PLEA 'VAS KNO,VINGLY AND INTELLl·
GEXTLY ENTERED.
Appellant contends that his plea of guilty was not
knowingly awl intelligently entered because the record
failed to show that the appellant intelligently and knoll"
ingly
waived his }lrivileire
against
self-incrimination norh
•
b
.
does it show that he was adequately informed of sue
privilege as required by Boykin v. Awbama, 395
238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed2d 274 (1969). Jn Boykin,
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supra, the United States Supreme Court made clear
the minimum requirements which satisfy due process
in the taking of pleas of guilty in state courts. The
Court held that the record must show the circumstances
of a waiver of rights and it must indicate that the guilty
plea is knowingly made. As the Court stated:
"Several federal constitutional rights are involvecl in a waiver that takes place when a plea
of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.
First, is the privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the }-.ourteenth [citation omitted]. Second, is the right
to tr; al by jury [citation omitted]. Third, is
the right to confront one's accusors [citation
omitted]. \Ve cannot presume a waiver of these
important federal rights from a silent record."
23 L.Ed 2d at 279.
The Court in Boykin held. as have numerous other
courts, that a guilty plea must be intelligently and voluntarily entered. Such is and has been the general rule.
See Brady r•. United Stati:s, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct.
1463, 25 L.Ed2d 747 (1970) at 756, fn. 5 and 6 and
cases therein cited. The standard enunciated by the
Court was simply that the voluntariness of the plea, if
it exists, must be made apparent on the record and the
record must show that a defendant accused of a crime is
aware of the various rights he is giving up by entering
a plea of guilty to the charge.
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In the present case the Court failed to inform appeJ.
lant of his Fifth Amendment right, the privilege agains!
self-incrimination. The Court did tell appellant tha!
a plea of guilty was a "judicial confession" (ExliibitJ.
D, p. 4) hut at no time did the court warn the appellan!
that he was not required to "confess" in court nor tha!
the Constitution of the United States gives him a prir·
ilege to not say anything that might incriminate him
m anyway.

It is admitted that the court did adequately inform
appellant of the other two focleral rights imolved in
Bo.IJli"in; but it is submitted that by failing to inform
appellant of his pri,·ilege against self-incrimination the
court inef'fectively complied with the standards of Boy·
kin. It is also submitted that an ineffectual attempt to
comply with Boykin is as insufficient as no compliance
at all. The involuntariness of appellant's guilty plea is
further substantiated by appellant's testimony at the
habeas corpus hearing that he was told that he would
get probation if he pleaded guilty and by appellant's
request to withchaw h:s guilty plea before sentencing
was imposed. ( R. 31, 29) Further, the record discloses
that at no point was appellant advised of the penalcy
for the of feme to which he eventually pleaded guilty
except that he would be "vulnerable to the sentence
provided by law for the charge." (Exhibit 1-D, P· 4)
It is submitted that because it is clear that the man·
dates of Bovli:in were not followed, appellant's con·
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finement is illegal and void and he must be granted
the writ of habeas corpus he seeks.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant did not
enter his plea of guilty knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily because he was not advised of his privilege
against self-incrimination and that appellant was effectively denied the assistance of counsel, appellant submits that the judgment and order of the court below
be reversed and the appellant granted his writ of habeas
corpus.

Respectfully submitted,

GUEGORY L. BOWN
Attorney for Appellant

